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ABSTRACT
An online user joins multiple social networks in order to en-
joy different services. On each joined social network, she cre-
ates an identity and constitutes its three major dimensions
namely profile, content and connection network. She largely
governs her identity formulation on any social network and
therefore can manipulate multiple aspects of it. With no
global identifier to mark her presence uniquely in the online
domain, her online identities remain unlinked, isolated and
difficult to search. Earlier research has explored the above
mentioned dimensions, to search and link her multiple iden-
tities with an assumption that the considered dimensions
have been least disturbed across her identities. However,
majority of the approaches are restricted to exploitation of
one or two dimensions. We make a first attempt to deploy
an integrated system Finding Nemo which uses all the three
dimensions of an identity to search for a user on multiple
social networks. The system exploits a known identity on
one social network to search for her identities on other so-
cial networks. We test our system on two most popular and
distinct social networks – Twitter and Facebook. We show
that the integrated system gives better accuracy than the
individual algorithms. We report experimental findings in
the paper.
Categories and Subject Descriptors
D.2.8 [Social search and retrieval systems]
General Terms
Online Social Networks, Identity search, Identity Resolution,
Privacy, Digital footprint
1. INTRODUCTION
Over the last decade, Online Social Media has evolved from
being a platform for broadcasting services (e.g. news, blogs)
to a rich multimedia platform for maintaining social con-
nections, thereby introducing online social networks. Each
online social network offers a service as their main unique
selling proposition e.g. Flickr offers photo sharing, Youtube
offers video sharing, Twitter offers micro-blogging. Variety
of services offered by multiple online social networks facili-
tate various ways of information sharing, leading to the mas-
sive popularity of social networks. Users spend more time
on Facebook than any other web brand / site, 1 Twitter
claims 600,000 new users and 200 million tweets per day, 2
and Facebook has 901 million users as of March 2012. The
statistics explain the impact of social media on an online
user.
Owing to a large number of online social networks, pop-
ular in different parts of the world, and facilitating different
services, a user becomes a member of multiple social net-
works. A user’s presence on multiple social networks helps
her to control the nature and audience of information shared
(e.g. professional and personal network), and the rate of in-
formation dissemination (e.g. viral or restricted) [1]. On
each joined social network, she creates an identity and con-
stitutes its three major dimensions namely Profile, Con-
tent and Network. Each dimension is composed of a set
of attributes which describes her and differentiate her from
others. Profile is composed of set of attributes which de-
scribes her persona such as username, name, age, location
etc. Content is composed of attributes which describes the
content she creates or is shared with her such as text, time of
post etc., and Network is composed of connection attributes
which describes the network, she creates to connect to other
users such as number of friends. Her identity creation pro-
cess on each social network involves her significant control
and she can choose to give / hide / skip / change her iden-
tity attributes, implying that she can constitute any dimen-
sion in any form on any identity. Therefore, her multiple
identities created by the similar processes, may vary largely.
Further, with no handle / identifier / attribute for a user to
mark her presence uniquely in Online Social Media domain,
her identities remain unlinked and isolated. Because of var-
ied and non-linked identities, it is difficult to find identities
of a user on multiple social networks when searched with
limited information about her and within a large pool of
users identified with the similar information.
Literature lists methods to exploit the three dimensions
of an identity to enhance information about a user and to
gain better hints towards her identities on multiple social
networks. Researchers have developed a set of approaches
which assume that the considered dimension is constituted
in a similar fashion by a user across her multiple identities.
1http://blog.nielsen.com/nielsenwire/social/
2http://searchenginewatch.com/article/2095216/
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Therefore, for that dimension, the attributes hold the same
or similar value across her identities, which can be further
used to link identities. We term such attributes as linking
attributes. For example, two identities are linked if profile
attributes as name, school and email hold same or similar
value on both identities [1]; for this illustration, name, school
and email are linking attributes. To the best of our knowl-
edge, majority of the approaches proposed exploited either
one or two dimensions for an identity search and linking,
thereby leaving other hints uninvestigated. We make a first
attempt to use all the three dimensions for identity search
and linking. We discuss a set of algorithms, one for each
dimension, to leverage available information about the user
and create a set of candidate identities for a user on a social
network. Each algorithm is re-engineered from existing algo-
rithms in the literature to adapt to real-time search, limited
availability of information and usage of the auxiliary infor-
mation left unexplored. We further merge the algorithms to
build a system Finding Nemo which is capable of exploiting
any linking attribute present in any dimension of an identity
of a user (details in Section 4). We test our algorithms and
the system on two most popular and distinct social networks
– Twitter and Facebook. We evaluate each algorithm and
our system on three parameters namely accuracy, candidate
set size and search time. Our major contributions are –
• To the best of our knowledge, we deploy the first re-
search based identity search system which exploits three
major dimensions of a user’s identity namely profile,
content and network, together.
• We use publicly accessible attributes and information
to make decisions on identity linking and therefore are
independent from any user authorization to gain re-
quired information.
• We show that users unconsciously and indirectly leak
their Facebook identity on Twitter by mentioning web
URLs containing their Facebook identity as well as by
using third party applications to post content simulta-
neously on multiple networks.
The proposed algorithms to find a user’s multiple identi-
ties can be applied to varied domains. In security domain,
our solutions can help searching for malicious user’s multiple
online identities. Malicious users exploit online social net-
works to enhance reachability to users (victims). To iden-
tify malicious users, security researchers have devised fea-
tures on individual networks [2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7]. Solutions
suggested to detect malicious user accounts are network de-
pendent, hence security analysts need to identify malicious
accounts on each networking site. In order to save iden-
tification cost and efforts, linking malicious user identities
present on multiple online social networks is suggested. Our
algorithms capturing behavioral characteristics can help in
linking malicious user identity on multiple social networks.
In privacy domain, each algorithm finds its application in
understanding the quantity and quality of the user’s infor-
mation leaks. Easily linkable multiple identities of a user
can leak a user’s private attributes via aggregation of user’s
information from multiple social networks [8, 9, 10, 11]. Sys-
tem analysts can understand the possible privacy leaks and
can then improve privacy policies and anonymization meth-
ods to preserve user’s privacy. We discuss some of the in-
formation leaks via public information and aggregation of
information in Section 5. Our solutions can help in building
recommendation feature for social aggregation sites. The
recommendation feature can find a user’s presence on mul-
tiple networks with the given user information on one net-
work and suggest her to aggregate the suggested identities
(probably belonging to her), hereby saving user effort. In
marketing domain, the algorithms can be applied to aggre-
gate customer data from multiple online shopping sites, to
understand customer preferences and buying patterns and
then recommend better deals to promote products.
The paper is organized as follows; Section 2 presents re-
lated literature and motivates the work described in this
paper. Section 3 discusses the proposed algorithms in de-
tail, followed by Section 4 which elaborates the evaluation
of the algorithms, and motivates the integration of the al-
gorithms to build a better system. We discuss applicability,
limitations and other observations in Section 5 and conclude
the paper with future research directions in Section 5.2.
2. RELATED WORK
Figure 1 presents a three dimensional conceptualization of
state of the art work discussed till date (to the best of our
knowledge) for identity search and linking in online social
media. Each dimension in the figure represents a distinct
aspect of a user’s online identity namely Profile, Content
and Network as discussed in Section 1. Each dimension is
further marked with two labels. The outer label represents
that the approach discussed in the work accessed private
and public attributes, while the inner label represents that
the work accessed limited and public attributes. 3 We now
discuss each of the work in detail.
Perito et al., Motoyama et al., and Irani et al. suggested
[Profile]
[Network]
[Content]
• Malhotra et al.
• Narayanan et al.
• Motoyama et al.
• Irani et al.
• Labitzke et al.
• Goga et al.
• Gani et al.
• Correa et al.
• Perito et al. 
• Iofciu et al. 
Figure 1: Conceptualization of state-of-the-art iden-
tity search and linking approaches across three di-
mensions of a user’s online identity.
methods which use only profile attributes to search and link
identities of a user across networks. Perito et al. introduced
the idea of using public attribute i.e. username to link multi-
ple online identities of a user. The authors suggested to link
Google and Ebay identities of a user via extracting string
based features from username of identities on two networks.
With two features and a dataset of 10,000 username pairs for
both positive and negative dataset, they achieved 71% ac-
curacy [12]. On the other hand, Motoyama et al. extended
the linking attribute set and suggested methods to find and
3Publicly accessible attributes may vary depending on the
social network involved.
link users’ online identities using both private and public at-
tributes. They used name, city, school, location, age, email
etc. as linking attributes and used bag-of-words model to
match profile attributes on two identities. With a dataset of
300 profiles for positive and 200 profiles for negative dataset,
they achieved 72% accuracy. They concluded ‘name’, ‘name
+ school’ and email as strong identity linkers [1]. Irani et al.
also worked on a set of both private and public attributes,
however only categorical attributes and used text matching
approaches to match two identities [13]. They concluded
that user identities could be accurately linked via a different
set of attributes as last name, birth year and country.
Owing to the limited set of profile attributes which are
public, accessible and available across multiple networks, re-
searchers attempted hybrid approaches to use more than
one dimension for identity linking. Malhotra et al. ex-
ploited profile and network dimension of a user’s identity
by adding number of friend connections along with public
profile attributes to link Twitter and LinkedIn identity of a
user. They used attribute specific comparison metrics e.g.
Jaro distance for username and name comparison, Tf-idf
vector space model for description comparison etc., to link
two identities. The authors evaluated their method over a
dataset of 29,129 users, and achieved an accuracy of 98%
with Naive Bayes classification. They proved username and
name as the best identity resolvers [14]. Iofciu et al., on the
other hand, merged public profile attributes with content
features and tried to link user identities across social tagging
systems using username and tags (content). The authors
evaluated their method on three social networks, Flickr, De-
licious and StumbleUpon and achieved an accuracy of 60%.
Furthermore, as suggested by Irani et al., the authors also
implemented the concept of social footprint. To search for
a user’s identity on a third network, they aggregated the
two linked identities and used the collective information to
link the third identity with the social footprint of the user.
When evaluated on the same dataset, the authors claimed to
link 80% of the user identities across three social networks
correctly [15].
A set of researchers experimented only with content di-
mension for identity linking. Goga et al. used three at-
tributes extracted from the content created by a user –
timestamp, location and description. The authors created
location profile for an identity, consisting of a pattern of
zip codes of places a user geotagged. They measured sim-
ilarity between two location profiles on the basis of cosine,
Jaccard and other metrics. They developed timing profiles
of two identities and similarity between two was measured
on the number of timestamp matches. Authors also devel-
oped language profiles derived from textual content user cre-
ated. The system was evaluated on Flickr, Twitter and Yelp,
where location and timing profiles helped to narrow down
the candidate set to search in for correct identity match
while language models hit 94.7% miss rate at 1% false alarm
rate [10]. This calls for a need to apply more sophisticated
techniques and extract more intuitive content based features
(e.g URLs, emoticons, spelling mistakes etc) for identity res-
olution. Some preliminary work was discussed in [16] where
authors presented the idea of applying authorship analysis
techniques on the content created by user to find multiple
identities of a user within a social network. Correa et al. ex-
plored the URLs embedded in the public content posted by
the user and observed that users often mention their iden-
tity on other networks via URLs posted to refer to their
pictures, videos or other content. The authors introduced a
system capable of finding identities of a user across networks
by mentioning URLs in their content [17].
Apart from profile and content attributes, an attempt
was made to link multiple identities by the third dimen-
sion i.e. network. Few de-anonymization techniques used
network attributes to link one anonymized and one labeled
user. Narayanan et al. used a graph theoretic approach to
de-anonymize Twitter users with the use of labelled Flickr
network [18]. The authors iteratively matched each node
network to find to most similar node with the similar net-
work and claimed 30.8% accuracy. However the method
needed a graph structure available on both networks, to de-
ploy graph based algorithm proposed. In real world, net-
work of a user is private giving an incomplete graph on any
of the social network involved in identity search. In such
cases, deanonymization algorithms have limited applicabil-
ity. Labitzke et al. also investigated the strengths of using
network for identity linking. They suggested a different ap-
proach of matching mutual friends of two identities to be
linked. The authors used string matching methods to link
names of common friends of two identities. If there exist
more than 3 mutual friends, the two identities were marked
as linked (belonging to same person) [19]. However, the ap-
proach had a gap of understanding that in real world, there
could be multiple mutual friends between two profiles, or no
mutual friends (in case when user used different social net-
works for different purpose). Further, it was assumed that
complete network for both the identities was accessible and
available, which may not be the case on each social network,
thereby the applicability of the approach is limited.
We apprehend that each dimension has been explored in
the literature with few approaches benefiting from integra-
tion of more than one dimension. However, value of integra-
tion of all the three dimensions, to search for a user identity
remains unexplored. To the best of our knowledge, we fill the
gap by associating all three dimensions to work together, in
order to search identity of a user on online social networks.
We further limit our approach to access public attributes
on any dimension, to avoid requirements for detailed infor-
mation about an identity, for identity search and resolution.
We are aware of few identity search systems e.g. Yasni, Pipl
and PeekYou 4 which uses multiple approaches to search for
a user on the Internet including social networks, however
the approaches are not disclosed and candidate set returned
for each user query are large, making the system unreliable
and effort consuming. We leave the verification of this claim
for our future work. Our work fills the gap of building a
research based open integrated system to find for a user’s
multiple online identities.
3. METHODOLOGY
In this section, we discuss the methodology proposed to
search for a user identities across social networks. For a
clear reference, the user whose identity is searched is termed
as “Nemo”. We explain a set of algorithms which exploit
publicly available information of nemo on Twitter, to search
for her identity on Facebook. The algorithms are – Pro-
file Search, Content Search, Self-mention Search and
Network Search. The algorithms access only publicly
available data about any user, as compared to other algo-
4www.yasni.com, www.pipl.com, www.peekyou.com
rithms proposed in literature which were allowed to access
detailed information about a user as discussed in Section 2.
We now discuss each of the algorithms in detail.
3.1 Profile Search
An identity of a user on a social network includes a set of
profile attributes, which gives basic information about the
user such as username, name, location, gender, description
etc. If the user does not demonstrate any active obfusca-
tion and does not create altogether a different identity, it
is likely that she re-uses certain profile attributes’ value, on
the social networks she joins. If the user demonstrates such
behavior, profile attributes can be used to find her identity
on other social networks. Profile Search method explores
“Profile” dimension of a user’s identity and exploits profile
attributes as linking attributes. To make comparisons be-
tween any two identities using linking attributes, it is es-
sential to have same set of attributes publicly available for
both identities. Twitter has a limited set of attributes how-
ever publicly available 5 while Facebook has larger set of
attributes, however private. We consider only those profile
attributes which are publicly available on both networks –
username, name, profile image and URL. Using the value of
these attributes for nemo on Twitter, we search Facebook.
We add location as another attribute available on Twitter to
refine the search on Facebook. The search produce a list of
candidate identities with same attribute values as of nemo
on Twitter. The flow of the Profile Search algorithm is il-
lustrated in Figure 2.
Firstly, we use nemo’s username on Twitter, and query
Twitter API to extract her name, username, location, pro-
file image and URL. We use URL attribute first to observe
if nemo herself has given her Facebook identity. We term
this behavior of mentioning one’s Facebook network iden-
tity (or any other network identity) on Twitter explicitly,
as “Self-Identification”. We observed two varieties of self-
identification behavior – one in which a user directly gives
her Facebook identity on her URL attribute and other in
which a user indirectly gives her Facebook identity via re-
ferring to a webpage on her URL attribute, that contains her
Facebook identity. A user referring to her blog on Twitter
URL with her blog having her Facebook identity is an exam-
ple of indirect self-identification. If nemo has not identified
herself via URL, we use her username, name and location
attribute to query Facebook Graph API to find identities
with same or similar username / name having the same
or similar location. Facebook Graph API returns a set of
searchable 6 identities (users, pages and communities) who
either have same name as the “queried” name or a part of
“queried name” in their name and share “queried” location. 7
We also search for a candidate identity on Facebook who has
the same username as nemo’s Twitter username. The reason
for this addition is that previous research shows that around
66% of users use same / similar usernames across social net-
works [17]. Therefore, there is a possibility of nemo using
the same username on Facebook as on Twitter. We aggre-
gate nemo’s candidate identities on Facebook as returned
by Facebook Graph API and term the set as “Non-ranked”
set. To further ease the search of nemo’s identity in the ag-
5Accessible to any user on the Internet.
6Users who allow to be searched within Facebook and do
not have this feature turned off in privacy settings.
7“Queried” name is nemo’s name on Twitter.
gregated set, we rank the candidate identities on the basis
of nemo’s Twitter profile image and the candidate identity’s
profile image similarity, using RGB histogram matching. It
is highly probable that nemo might use same profile picture
on more than one networks. On the ranked candidate set,
a manual verification is done to accurately locate nemo’s
Facebook identity.
alice123
Twitter 
Search API
Name, Username
Profile Image,
URL
If URL 
has 
Facebook 
ID?
No
Facebook 
Graph API
Username + Name
Profile Image 
Matching
(Tw, Fb)
Non-Ranked 
Candidate Set
Ranked Candidate 
Set
Manual Search 
and Verification
Yes
Figure 2: Profile Search Algorithm. In this method,
we use profile information of a user to locate her
identity on Facebook.
3.2 Content Search
An identity of a user on a social network includes the content
that she creates or is shared with her. Owing to the pop-
ularity of social aggregation sites and ways to link multiple
networks together, a user pushes the same content on multi-
ple networks simultaneously. For example, Twitter provides
a functionality to connect Twitter and Facebook identity
to post user’s tweets on her Facebook timeline, Twitter-
feed 8 allows a user to connect Twitter, Facebook, LinkedIn
to push feeds in three social networks simultaneously. Be-
cause of such services, it is likely that a user generates same
content on multiple social networks. Such a user behavior
can be exposed by Twitter API which provides the “source”
of a tweet i.e. from where the tweet is posted e.g. Face-
book, Twitterfeed etc. Source can be exploited to reduce
the search space for a user’s online identities, if an analyst
intend to save her efforts by searching for a user in only
social networks where she has hints of her existence. Con-
tent Search method uses content as a linking attribute for
users who use the mentioned services. In this paper, we
do not use source of the tweets since we limit our focus to
search for nemo’s identity only on Facebook and with the
help of ground truth we know the nemo has a Facebook
identity. However, we plan to use this information in our
future work.
Figure 3 explains the flow of content search algorithm.
We extract most recent 100 (or less) 9 posts by nemo, and
process each of the posts to limit the length to 75 charac-
ters and to remove non-ascii characters. We query Facebook
Graph API with the processed post to search for the users
who posted same or similar content on Facebook. Facebook
Graph API returns a candidate set of Facebook identities of
8http://www.twitterfeed.com
9We limit to process most recent 100 tweets to avoid long
execution time.
alice123
Twitter 
Search API
Extract Tweets
 (Content)
Extract
Source of Tweet
Networks 
to be
 searched are 
given?
No
Pre-process each tweet
Removal of non-ascii character
Length < 80 char
Social
Network API
(E.g. Facebook)
Non-Ranked 
Candidate Set
Cosine Similarity 
Matching
(Tw, Fb)
Ranked 
Candidate Set
Manual Search 
and Verification
Yes
Input social network
Figure 3: Content Search Algorithm. In this
method, we use content of a user to locate her iden-
tity on Facebook. We search for Facebook users who
posted / shared similar content as tweeted by nemo.
users who posted similar content as queried content, which
is then fed into our ranking engine. Ranking rank the candi-
date identities on the basis of cosine similarity score between
the nemo’s tweet terms and candidate identity’s post terms.
A manual verification is further needed to hover on each
candidate profile, and search for nemo’s correct Facebook
identity.
3.3 Self-mention Search
This method exploits a user’s tendency to cross-pollinate in-
formation on Online Social Media [20] and was introduced
by Correa et al. [17]. The method explores content at-
tributes of nemo and assumes that if nemo has accounts on
two or more networks, she might cross refer to her other ac-
count, in few of her tweets. For example, nemo might post
a tweet with a URL referring to an album on Flickr, indi-
rectly revealing her Flickr identity. We term this behavior of
posting URLs indirectly but consciously, pointing to user’s
other network identity as “Self-mention”. Self-mention be-
havior allow identity leaks via content created in the form
of URLs by the user. This method exploits self-mention be-
havior to search for a user identities across networks.
Figure 4 illustrates the process. We query Twitter Search
API to extract 100 (or less) recent tweets by nemo and fil-
ter out the tweets with URLs and then further process each
URL to verify if it refers to Facebook. We create a set of all
the Facebook URLs posted by nemo, query Facebook Graph
API to process each URL and extract name and username
of the candidate user (if the URL refers to a user’s identity
and not apps). We then calculate candidate identity’s user-
name similarity with nemo’s Twitter username to rank the
candidate set. A manual verification of top rank candidate
identity and most frequently referred candidate identity de-
cides nemo’s Facebook identity.
3.4 Network Search
Network is an important dimension of a user’s identity on a
social network. It is a shared identity of a user build with
the involvement of other users [21]. If other users leak their
identity on any other social network, it is likely that the
user’s identity also gets leaked. Network Search algorithm
explores the possibility of an user’s identity leak via her net-
work attribute.
We search for nemo’s identity on Facebook using her Twit-
ter network. We consider her three Twitter networks – fol-
alice123
Twitter 
Search API
Extract Tweets
 (Content)
Extract URLs
in tweets
If any URL 
points to 
other social 
network ?
Yes No User can’t be
located
Social Network 
API
(Extract user handle
 and name)
Username
  similarity + 
Frequency
Figure 4: Self-mention Search Algorithm. In this
method, we use content information of a user to
observe if a user herself has posted a link to her
Facebook post / identity.
lower network, followee network and friend network. Fol-
lower network is composed of users who follow nemo and has
her least control in creation of the network. Followee net-
work includes users whom nemo follows and has her huge
control in creation of network. Friends network intersects
both followee and follower network and includes users who
follow nemo as well as are followed by her. Friend network
on Twitter can be considered as bilateral network, similar
to friends network on Facebook, with both users involved
actively in the decision to build the relationship. For each
of the three networks, we filter out those who have self -
identified themselves on Facebook via their Twitter URL.
In this way, we map nemo’s network from Twitter to Face-
book. We now assume that nemo connects to a same subset
of users on both social networks. We search for nemo’s name
in public Facebook friend-list of mapped Facebook identities
of nemo’s Twitter network users. If a Facebook identity with
same / similar name as nemo is friends with more than one
nemo’s follower / followee / friend identity on Facebook, the
Facebook identity is claimed to be nemo’s Facebook identity
(see Figure 5). In this way, we try to reverse map nemo’s
identity from one social network to another via mapping her
network on two social networks. Note that the method is ap-
plicable, even when the complete network of nemo’s network
or the network structure of nemo’s network on Facebook is
partially available.
In a nutshell, we experiment with all the three major di-
Twitter URL - http://www.facebook.com/xyz
Set of Friends / Followers / Followees. 
Pick users with self-mentioned identity 
on Facebook
Queried user - “alice123”
Name - Alice
Subset of Friends
Name - Alice
bob123
bob123
bob
alice.1
Figure 5: Network Search Algorithm. In this
method, we use nemo’s Twitter network to locate
her identity on Facebook.
mensions of a user’s identity on a social network. We observe
that some users consciously give their Facebook identity by
self-identification, and self-mention while other users are un-
informed with no intensions of giving her Facebook identity
e.g. identity leak via name, location, content and network.
We now evaluate each of the algorithms discussed to un-
derstand its effectiveness in finding a user online identities.
4. EVALUATION
To evaluate the algorithms, we borrowed a ground truth
dataset from [14] collected from Social Graph API. The
dataset consisted of 505,466 users who themselves mentioned
their identity on multiple social networks including Twitter
and Facebook. To avoid bias in the evaluation either towards
a dataset of users with multiple identity leaks or a dataset
of users with few identity leaks, we randomly selected 543 10
users from the bigger dataset (505,466) and evaluated the al-
gorithms. We measured the efficiency of the algorithms on
three parameters – Accuracy, Candidate set size, and Search
time. We define each of the parameters below -
• Accuracy - The metric is defined as ratio of users for
whom correct Facebook identity is returned and users
for whom Facebook identity is searched. Higher the
accuracy, better is the algorithm.
• Candidate set size - The parameter measures the
number of candidate identities returned for a searched
Twitter user. Smaller the candidate set size, easier is
for an analyst to search in for correct Facebook identity
of the user.
• Search time - It is defined as time taken to return
the candidate set for a searched Twitter user. Lesser
the time, faster is the algorithm.
We evaluated the algorithms on a Ubuntu server with six
quad core processors each of 1.87GHz speed, 16Gb RAM,
8Gb cache size.
4.1 Profile Search
4.1.1 Accuracy
With Profile Search, we could locate Facebook identities for
205 users (37.7%) within the candidate set returned, via
URL mentioned by user herself, by search with the same
username on Facebook or search via user’s name, username
and location specified on Twitter. We further quantified the
number of users located correctly on Facebook by each of
the three methods and their combinations. Table 1 gives
the numbers. We observed that 25.2% of the 543 users
had consciously mentioned their Facebook identity by men-
tioning it on Twitter’s URL attribute (directly or indirectly
as discussed in Section 3.1). However, for 27.4% of users
who did not mention their Facebook identity as URL, the
method identified their Facebook account by either search-
ing for same username or searching user’s name, username
and location. An uninformed and unintended identity expo-
sure via their profile attributes gave away a user’s identity
on other social network.
4.1.2 Candidate set size
We analyzed the number of candidate Facebook identities
returned by Profile Search. Figure 6(a) shows the distribu-
tion of Facebook candidate identities set size for the users
whose correct identity was located within the candidate set
(205 users). We observed that for most of the users, candi-
date set size varied from 0 to 20 11 We then analyzed the
10We are continuously running the experiments. We report
the till date dataset and evaluation results.
11We queried Graph API to return a maximum of 60 candi-
date identities for a user.
Search Method Accuracy
(out of
543)
Accuracy
in per-
centage
URL Search (URL) 137 25.2%
Same username Search (SU) 82 15.1%
Name Location Search (NL) 144 26.5%
URL+ SU 175 32.2%
URL + NL 200 36.8%
SU + NL 149 27.4%
URL + SU + NL 205 37.7%
Table 1: Profile Search Evaluation. We observed
that 25.2% of the users had mentioned their Face-
book identity in the URL on Twitter, however even
without that information, we were able to find iden-
tity on Facebook for 27.4% of the users.
affect of ranking candidate identities on the basis of profile
image matching, in order to reduce the candidate set size to
search in for user’s Facebook identity. We investigated the
rank at which correct identity of the user is returned, both
for the ranked candidate set and non-ranked candidate set.
We analyzed 205 users and observed that correct identity
of a user could be located at lower rank with ranking as
compared to without ranking. We observed that for 98% of
the users, correct identity on Facebook was located within
top-5 candidates of non-ranked candidate set with 2% users
located in top-25 candidates while for 99.51% of the users,
correct identity was located within top-10 ranks of ranked
candidate set. Hence, an analyst had to scan only top-10
results, irrespective of the candidate set size returned by
method, for 99.51% of the users for whom Facebook iden-
tity was recognized correctly.
4.1.3 Search time
We analyzed the time taken to search for the user via profile
attributes and for majority of the users, search time is less
than a minute. Time taken to rank the candidate set was
negligible. However, we restricted the Graph API to return
maximum of 60 candidate identities for a user. If we had
extended the limit, we believe that search time could have
increased. We left the verification of the claim to our future
work.
Therefore, for a Twitter user searched, Profile Search al-
gorithm returned a larger set of candidate Facebook identi-
ties within a minute. Correct Facebook identity was identi-
fied for 37.3% of user and located within top-10 candidate
identities by manual verification.
4.2 Content Search
4.2.1 Accuracy
We evaluated Content search algorithm with 543 users and
received a set of candidate Facebook identities for 124 users
only (22.8%). When searched for the correct identity out of
the candidate identities for a user, only three users’ Face-
book identities were correctly identified, reporting an accu-
racy of 0.5%. Accuracy of the algorithm turned out to be
low (0.5%) owing to multiple reasons. Firstly, only a limited
number of users (22.8%) received a candidate set of Face-
book identities. The reasons could be – users did not post
same / similar content across networks or the users did post
same / similar content across networks, however their con-
tent on Facebook was not publicly available and searchable.
Secondly, candidate Facebook identities were returned be-
cause of the popular content tweeted by nemo and posted
by hundreds of users on Facebook (e.g. quotes, sayings). It
was highly probable that nemo’s correct Facebook identity
was not returned in the candidate set. 12 However, there
were few Twitter users for whom the corresponding Face-
book identity posted same content with her friends only but
her friends re-posted the same content and shared with pub-
lic, making the content searchable and the correct Facebook
identity could then be identified. We sense an information
privacy leak for the user via her friends re-sharing activity.
4.2.2 Candidate set size
We analyzed the candidate set size returned for the users
for whom correct Facebook identity is returned. We ob-
served that the candidate set size ranged from 8 - 30 (see
Figure 6(b)). The candidate set size could have been larger
if more than 100 posts of a user were queried to find the
Facebook identity.
4.2.3 Search time
Content Search method returned the candidate set within
20 secs for the three users correctly identified on Facebook,
faster than the Profile Search method (see Table 2). Lower
search time could be attributed to few tweets available to
search on Facebook for all three users.
We believed that success of the algorithm was depen-
User Profile
Search
Content
Search
User 1 46.0s 15.6s
User 2 40.2s 12.6s
User 3 3.8s 15.4s
Table 2: Comparison of Profile Search and Content
Search on the basis of Search time.
dent on the availability of user posts on both networks.
To verify the belief, we experimented with another ran-
domly selected sample from the bigger dataset consisting
of 356 users. We repeated our Content Search evaluation
and located 12 users’ Facebook identity correctly (accuracy
of 3.4%). Therefore, accuracy of the method was highly de-
pendent on the presence of users in the evaluation dataset
who leak their identity via content as well as for whom the
content is publicly available on both networks.
4.3 Self-mention Search
4.3.1 Accuracy
We experimented with 543 Twitter users, and searched in
most recent 100 tweets of a user. Only 31 Twitter users’
Facebook identities were correctly identified (accuracy of
5.7%) via URLs posted by them. On further manual inves-
tigation, we observed that most of the users posted URLs
pointing to either Facebook profile page or her Facebook
post / video / picture, thereby revealing their Facebook
identity on Twitter indirectly, consciously.
4.3.2 Candidate set size
Self mention Search largely reduced the candidate set size as
shown in Figure 6(c). For majority of the correctly identified
users, the correct identity was located within top-3 results.
Therefore, an analyst had to search in smaller candidate set,
thereby proving the effectiveness of the algorithm.
12It depends on Facebook API recall for a search query.
4.3.3 Search time
We analyzed the time taken to return the candidate set and
observed that self-mention search took more time as com-
pared to Profile and Content Search (ranging from 1 - 150s)
for majority of the users (see Figure 7(c)). The reason for
the higher search time was the presence of URL in majority
of user’s tweets. Each URL was processed to extract Face-
book identity from a given URL. URL resolution process
was time-expensive and repeating the process for each URL
added to higher search time for Self-mention algorithm.
Therefore, Self-mention search revealed Facebook identity
for 5.7% of the users within top-3 candidate identities at the
cost of more search time.
4.4 Network Search
4.4.1 Accuracy
We experimented with same set of 543 Twitter users to eval-
uate Network Search algorithm with three networks (follow-
ers, followee and friends) to understand which network has
the highest capability to expose a user’s Facebook identity.
We observed that network search exposed only one user’s
Facebook identity via her follower network. The reason for
low accuracy was that even though people in the user’s Twit-
ter network mentioned their Facebook identity on Twitter,
their friend-list on Facebook was not public and therefore,
only few users could be located. No users were identified by
followee network since the network majorly included celebri-
ties, brands and events which had corresponding page iden-
tities on Facebook with no friends attribute. We tried to
extract users who liked and subscribed to pages and com-
munity, but the information was not publicly available. No
users’ were identified by friends network owing to the re-
stricted access to their Facebook friend-list.
To verify the failure of the algorithm, we evaluated Net-
work search algorithm on a different dataset. The dataset
consisted of 10 users from India whose correct Twitter and
Facebook identity were recorded manually with the help of
authors’ offline information about users. We executed Net-
work Search on this dataset and found Facebook identity for
seven of them. Varying accuracies on different datasets dis-
prove the failure of the algorithm. On this basis, we accept
that network search algorithm fails when the required infor-
mation to find a user’s Facebook identity is unavailable and
restricted, however we emphasize on the non-zero accuracy
of the method, verifying that the method can be exploited
to leak a user’s identity.
4.4.2 Candidate set size
For the one user correctly identified on Facebook, the method
returned only one candidate identity, which is the correct
Facebook identity itself. The method reduced the candidate
set size largely and increased the precision of finding the
correct Facebook identity in top-1 candidates. However, we
do not generalize the observation. We think that since the
method involved specific user attributes (network) which is
likely not same for a large set of users, the method has the
potential to return correct Facebook identity as the candi-
date set.
4.4.3 Search time
Network Search algorithm returned a precise candidate set
at the expense of huge search time. The method took more
than 2 hours on an average to search for the user’s Face-
book identity. However, the huge search time involved sleep
(a) Profile Search (b) Content Search (c) Self-mention Search (d) Finding Nemo
Figure 6: Evaluation of Profile Search, Content Search, Self-mention Search method and Finding Nemo on
the basis of candidate set size returned.
(a) Profile Search (b) Content Search (c) Self-mention Search (d) Finding Nemo
Figure 7: Evaluation of Profile Search, Content Search, Self-mention Search method and Finding Nemo on
time taken to generate candidate set.
time, because of the Twitter API rate limit (350 requests /
hr). Network search method involved searching for all the
users in nemo’s network, who self-identified themselves. For
the same, the method queried each user in nemo’s network
composed of thousands of users (767 followers for the user
identified). During the search, the rate limit exceeded, and
the method had to wait till the next hour. We optimized
the algorithm to do processing in the mean time, as well as
quit as soon as two users in the network find nemo’s Face-
book identity, however we could reduce the time to 1.4 hours
for the user identified. Network Search algorithm gives the
correct Facebook identity for a small set of users, within
a minimum candidate set size, however takes huge search
time.
With each of the algorithms, we observe that as we exper-
iment with attributes ranging from generic attributes to spe-
cific attributes about a user, candidate size decreases and be-
comes more precise however at the cost of more time and less
accuracy. The reason is that more specific attributes expose
precise information about the user, which is true for small set
of users, while generic attributes expose information about
a user, which can be true for large set users also. However,
computing precise information takes time and therefore the
search time is the highest for search via network. Owing to
the variation of accuracy of identity search algorithms, we
integrated all the four methods together to build a system,
which must capture available identity exposures via any di-
mension – profile, content and network.
4.5 Integrated System
Owing to low accuracy of each method, we built an in-
tegrated architecture by combining all four algorithms in
one system named as “Finding Nemo”. 13 The system can
be queried with a Twitter identity to search her Facebook
13http://precog.iiitd.edu.in/findingnemo/home
identity. Any of the four algorithms can locate her Face-
book identity. If a candidate identity is returned by either
self-identification, self-mention or by more than one algo-
rithm, the candidate identity is returned by the system as
the Facebook identity of the user. In other scenarios, candi-
date identities returned by each algorithm are ORed. The
system returns a set of Facebook identities as which may /
may not contain correct Facebook identity.
4.5.1 Accuracy
We measured the effectiveness of Finding Nemo by evalu-
ating the system for the same dataset of 543 users. We
observed that for 220 Twitter users (40.5%), correct Face-
book identity were identified within the candidate identities
returned by the system. Table 3 lists the accuracy of individ-
ual algorithms as well as of the complete integrated system.
Search Algorithm # of users
identified
Accuracy
Profile Search (P) 205 37.7%
Content Search (C) 3 0.5%
Self-mention Search (SM) 31 5.7%
Network Search (N) 1 0.2%
Finding Nemo 220 40.5%
Table 3: Accuracy of each algorithm, and the system
Finding Nemo.
4.5.2 Candidate set size
Figure 6(d) shows the candidate set size distribution for the
users who were correctly identified on Facebook by the sys-
tem. We observed that for majority of users, candidate set
size largely reduced while for some increased, as compared
to individual algorithms. The reason being that for majority
of users, their Facebook identity was exposed either by self-
identification, self-mention and by more than one method.
As soon as the system encountered a user’s Facebook iden-
tity exposure in any of the three scenarios, it returned the
Facebook identity, without processing other methods for
identity search. However, for other users, no candidate Face-
book identity existed which was found by more than one
method and therefore, system collated all candidate identi-
ties returned by individual methods, thereby increased the
candidate set size.
4.5.3 Search time
We analyzed search time of the system to search for users’
Facebook identity in real-time. We queried system at dif-
ferent times of the day to avoid Twitter rate limit expiry.
Figure 7(d) shows the search time distribution for the users
correctly identified by the system. The system came to
halt as soon as a Facebook identity was recognized via self-
identification, self-mention or by more than one method.
Therefore, majority of users were identified within 50 secs
(system did not need to exploit all four methods). For
one user, identified by network search method and no other
method, took 5,535 secs and therefore system took too much
time searching via all the four methods. 14
In conclusion, Finding Nemo returned reduced candidate
size to search in for majority of users, however at the cost
of time. Figure 8 shows screenshot of Finding Nemo when
searched for Twitter user - pari lakshya. pari lakshya ex-
posed her Facebook identity via her profile attributes as
well as her network attributes. The system is successful in
finding groups’ and celebrities’ Facebook identity also. We
evaluated each identity search algorithm on a test bed of
two most popular social networks and observed a non-zero
accuracy of each algorithm. We therefore emphasize on the
possibility of success of the algorithms when applied with
private information access (apart from publicly available),
and on other social networks.
(a) pari lakshya
Figure 8: Finding Nemo: screenshot
5. DISCUSSION
In this work, we explore the possibility of searching a user
identity on multiple social networks, by exploiting public
information about her. A user gives away references to her
identities in her publicly accessible profile, content and net-
work attributes, knowingly or unknowingly. Even if she con-
sciously does not leave any identity leaks, her identity can
be leaked via loose privacy decisions of her friends, thereby
posing a threat to her privacy. We attempt to exploit only
those allusions to a user’s social network identity, which
14System processed four algorithms in a serial manner – Pro-
file, Self-mention, Content, and Network.
are supported by the involved social networks (Twitter and
Facebook). The algorithms need to be reformulated if they
are applied on other social networks depending on the in-
formation support a social network provides. For example,
LinkedIn API does not provide access to the network of any
user unless the user authorizes via an app. Therefore, a
random user’s identity search via network search algorithm
is not applicable without the user’s authorization. Appli-
cability of each algorithm is dependent on the information
support infrastructure provided by the social networks on
which a user’s identity is known and searched.
Further, the effectiveness of each algorithm and the sys-
tem depends on the presence of the required identity infor-
mation provided by the user’s attributes on the considered
dimension. The algorithm fails to find other social network
identity for a user, if a user is self-aware and informed about
certain identity exposures (e.g. no mention of urls in tweets
or restricted access to friends). This is evident by differ-
ent accuracy achieved by each algorithm. However, we suc-
cessfully reduce the candidate set of identities to search in,
thereby saving time and effort.
Apart from Facebook, we observe that users often self-
mention their identity on few photo sharing and video shar-
ing social networks, via URLs posted in tweets pointing to
the pictures / videos uploaded on the networks. Table 4
shows the ranked list of the social networks embedded in
URL by 2132 Twitter users (randomly selected from bigger
dataset). With multiple exposed identities of a user, a de-
tailed footprint can be created by aggregating user’s details
from Twitter, Facebook, other networks which may lead to
exposure of certain private attributes e.g. gender, date of
birth, family etc.
We argue that systems like Finding Nemo can be used
Social Network % of users
Instagram 36.6%
Youtube 29.7%
Foursquare 6.1%
Tumblr 6.0%
Yfrog 4.0%
Table 4: Social networks embedded in the URLs.
to help an analyst to search for malicious user identities,
banned organizations, a friend to search for a friend’s social
network identities, and social web administrator to build a
footprint of a user to disallow creation of fake identities,
given the support of social networks. However, we also en-
vision that such systems can be exploited to breach a user’s
privacy and to target victims for other attacks e.g. spear
phishing.
5.1 Limitations
5.1.1 Algorithms
The success of the proposed algorithms is limited by variety
of factors. Firstly, algorithms are dependent on the exposure
of required information by a user and on the social network
information support. For each social network, algorithms
need to be reformulated, to include other hints of identity
exposures available. Secondly, the algorithms exploit only
few identity leaks and therefore fail if the discussed iden-
tity leaks are patched. The algorithms are not scalable to
find other hints for identity search. Thirdly, algorithms are
highly dependent on a social network support for a better
recall and lastly, few algorithms (Self-mention and Network
search) have large search time owing the social network re-
strictions on number of queries, which may not be useful
when there is a need to find a user’s multiple identities in
runtime fashion.
5.1.2 Evaluation
We choose a random set of 543 users out of 505,466 users,
which may include users who had certain identity leaks lead-
ing to better accuracy for a particular method and low ac-
curacy for other algorithms. As discussed, the results are
highly dependent on the quality of identity exposure pro-
vided by the user and therefore the dataset used for eval-
uation. The results can be biased by the dataset used for
evaluation, however we try to minimize the bias by using a
random sample from a bigger dataset. We plan to evalu-
ate the algorithms and system over a large dataset of users,
specifically targeting various age groups, profession and de-
mographics, to claim the generic success of the algorithms
and therefore the success of Finding Nemo.
5.2 Future Work
Our system, Finding Nemo successfully found Facebook iden-
tities for 40% of the users (219) given their identity on Twit-
ter. To find the other 60% of the users, the algorithms can be
re-devised and improved to more sophisticated approaches
to capture granularities present in identity leaks e.g author-
ship profiles, temporal characteristics, timing profiles and
network characteristics. We plan to extend Finding Nemo
to search for a user’s identity on any social network in real-
time, given her identity on any social network in future.
We also envision the system to provide feedback to the user
about her possible identity exposures and suggest to patch
them, in order to preserve privacy across networks.
6. REFERENCES
[1] M. Motoyama and G. Varghese, “I seek you: searching
and matching individuals in social networks,” in
Proceedings of the eleventh international workshop on
Web information and data management, ser. WIDM
’09, 2009.
[2] C. Grier, K. Thomas, V. Paxson, and M. Zhang,
“@spam: the underground on 140 characters or less,”
in Proceedings of the 17th ACM conference on
Computer and communications security, ser. CCS ’10,
2010.
[3] K. Lee, J. Caverlee, and S. Webb, “Uncovering social
spammers: social honeypots + machine learning,” in
Proceedings of the 33rd international ACM SIGIR
conference on Research and development in
information retrieval, ser. SIGIR ’10, 2010.
[4] F. Benevenuto, G. Magno, T. Rodrigues, and
V. Almeida, “Detecting spammers on twitter,” in
Proceedings of the 7th Annual Collaboration,
Electronic messaging, Anti-Abuse and Spam
Conference (CEAS), 2010.
[5] Z. Chu, S. Gianvecchio, H. Wang, and S. Jajodia,
“Who is tweeting on twitter: human, bot, or cyborg?”
in Proceedings of the 26th Annual Computer Security
Applications Conference, ser. ACSAC ’10, 2010.
[6] F. Benevenuto, T. Rodrigues, V. Almeida, J. Almeida,
and M. Gonc¸alves, “Detecting spammers and content
promoters in online video social networks,” in
Proceedings of the 32nd international ACM SIGIR
conference on Research and development in
information retrieval. ACM.
[7] D. Irani, S. Webb, and C. Pu, “Study of static
classification of social spam profiles in myspace,” in
ICWSM, 2010.
[8] E. Zheleva and L. Getoor, “To join or not to join: the
illusion of privacy in social networks with mixed
public and private user profiles,” in Proceedings of the
18th international conference on World wide web, ser.
WWW ’09, 2009.
[9] B. Krishnamurthy and C. E. Wills, “On the leakage of
personally identifiable information via online social
networks.” ACM, 2010.
[10] O. Goga, H. Lei, S. H. K. Parthasarathi, G. Friedland,
RobinSommer, and R. Teixeira, “On exploiting
innocuous user activity for correlating accounts across
social network sites,” 2012.
[11] T. Chen, M. A. Kaafar, A. Friedman, and R. Boreli,
“Is more always merrier?: a deep dive into online
social footprints,” in Proceedings of the 2012 ACM
workshop on Workshop on online social networks, ser.
WOSN ’12, 2012.
[12] D. Perito, C. Castelluccia, M. A. Kaˆafar, and
P. Manils, “How unique and traceable are usernames?”
in PETS, 2011.
[13] D. Irani, S. Webb, K. Li, and C. Pu, “Large online
social footprints–an emerging threat,” in Proceedings of
the 2009 International Conference on Computational
Science and Engineering - Volume 03, ser. CSE ’09.
Washington, DC, USA: IEEE Computer Society, 2009.
[14] A. Malhotra, L. Totti, W. Meira, P. Kumaraguru, and
V. Almeida, “Studying user footprints in different
online social networks,” Accepted at International
Workshop on Cybersecurity of Online Social Network
(CSOSN), 2012.
[15] T. Iofciu, P. Fankhauser, F. Abel, and K. Bischoff,
“Identifying users across social tagging systems,” in
ICWSM, 2011.
[16] K. Gani, H. Hacid, and R. Skraba, “Towards multiple
identity detection in social networks,” in Proceedings
of the 21st international conference companion on
World Wide Web, 2012, pp. 503–504.
[17] D. Correa, A. Sureka, and R. Sethi, “Whacky! - what
anyone could know about you from twitter,” in PST,
2012.
[18] A. Narayanan and V. Shmatikov, “De-anonymizing
social networks,” in Proceedings of the 2009 30th IEEE
Symposium on Security and Privacy, ser. SP ’09.
Washington, DC, USA: IEEE Computer Society.
[19] S. Labitzke, I. Taranu, and H. Hartenstein, “What
your friends tell others about you: Low cost linkability
of social network profiles,” 2011.
[20] P. Jain, T. Rodrigues, G. Magno, P. Kumaraguru, and
V. Almeida, “Cross-pollination of information in
online social media: A case study on popular social
networks,” in SocialCom/PASSAT, 2011.
[21] M. Rowe, “The credibility of digital identity
information on the social web: a user study,” in
WICOW, 2010, pp. 35–42.
